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Abstract 
This paper explores the tension between standardization and autonomy raised by the 
implementation of new technology in healthcare organisations. The theoretical frame 
of this study is grounded in the impact of new technologies on work organisation, 
routinization and autonomy across settings. Empirically it presents evidence from two 
NHS Trusts in England that implemented a national Electronic Patient Record (EPR). 
The paper aims to reinvigorate the debate on the tension between standardization and 
autonomy in professional workplaces such as healthcare. It argues that the implication 
of technology in professional work conditions processes of task routinization that 
constrain autonomy, and enables reallocation of discretion between professional 
groups. We argue that routinization is not restricted to low-skill work but may travel 
across contexts and be evidenced in high-skill work environments. The interplay 
between routinization and autonomy is also useful in drawing insights concerning the 
dynamics of change that occur in professional work.   
Keywords: autonomy, healthcare, professionals, technology, standardization, 
discretion 
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Introduction 
 
In the past decades the National Health Service (NHS) in England has been subject to 
successive reforms, designed to ‘modernize’ the way healthcare services are provided. 
These reforms and their implications for work have been studied from a range of 
perspectives. There is a stable body of literature that examines the implications of 
institutional reforms for work organization and practices, including the reorganisation 
of work roles between healthcare professionals (Bach et al., 2008; Bach et al., 2012) 
and the introduction of work flexibilities  (Desombre et al., 2006; Grimshaw, 2000; 
Leverement et al., 1998). This strand of literature tends to largely ignore the role of 
technology in reshaping work organisation in healthcare. 
 
Another strand of literature has looked at the process of implementation of various 
information technology (IT) solutions in healthcare, including: Electronic Patient 
Records (EPR) (Halford et al., 2010; Davidson & Chiasson, 2005; Greenhalgh et al., 
2009; Oborn et al., 2011), enterprise resource planning systems (Boonstra & Govers, 
2009), electronic prescriptions (Boonstra et al., 2004; Motulsky et al., 2011) and call-
centres (Mueller et al., 2008). Although these studies often examined the boundaries 
between inter-professional roles, values and the contested process of change, little 
attention has been paid to the implications of technology for work autonomy and task 
discretion in healthcare organisations (Barrett et al., 2011; Petrakaki et al., 2016). 
 
The present study seeks to address this gap by examining the impact of new EPR on 
work standardization, autonomy and discretion. We report evidence from two case 
studies of NHS Trusts that implemented a national EPR, the National Care Record 
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Service, part of the National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) in the 
NHS in England (Sheikh et al., 2011). The NPfIT aimed to streamline healthcare 
organisations and the delivery of care, but was deemed to fail to meet its targets and 
realise its anticipated benefits (National Audit Office, 2011). It was thus dismantled in 
2011. Although it has been a defunct programme it presents us with rich historical 
material concerning processes of standardization of work conditioned by the 
introduction of technology in healthcare that are applicable more widely beyond the 
particular programme, context or time span.  
 
The overall aim of the paper is to further our understanding of the tension between 
standardization and task discretion that is raised by the implementation of new IT 
solutions in a context of high-skilled professional workplace, such as healthcare. In 
this paper we assume that routinization of work is a potential outcome of 
standardization and that autonomy is, among other things, the ability to exercise 
discretion. 
 
One of the contributions of this paper is the synthesis of insights from scholarly works 
that have examined standardization of work in low-skilled environments. By drawing 
a comparison with the literature on routinization of work in call-centres, we attempt to 
challenge how professional autonomy and medical rationality are taken for granted in 
healthcare settings. Our paper seeks to reinvigorate the debate on the tension between 
standardization and autonomy. To this end, we contend that the concept of 
routinization of work may travel across contexts and is useful for drawing insights 
and understanding the dynamics of change even in highly-skilled professional groups 
such as doctors and nurses. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The first section reviews the 
theoretical frame of this study, which is grounded in the impact of new technologies 
on work organisation, looking more specifically into the dynamics between 
standardization and autonomy in different organisational contexts. The second section 
elaborates on the research design and methodology of this study. The third section 
presents the two case studies and charts the interplay between standardization and 
autonomy in the workload of healthcare professionals. The final section discusses the 
findings and provides conclusions. 
 
Between routinization and professional autonomy: Technology in healthcare  
 
Several scholarly works have contemplated the transformative impact of technology 
on work (Adler, 1992; Boreham et al., 2008; Hyman & Streeck, 1988; Zuboff, 1988). 
There is an on-going debate as to whether the introduction of new technology leads to 
job enrichment and upskilling/re-skilling or routinization and deskilling (Munro & 
Rainbird, 2002, p.234; Zuboff, 1988). Such dichotomous conceptualisations may 
conceal the variety of workers’ experiences in different organisational forms such as 
public-private partnerships with networks of subcontracting and IT vendors and 
suppliers (Grimshaw et al., 2010, p.419). Functional flexibility is key as regards 
employees’ ability to be deployed to match the tasks required by changing technology 
(Procter, 2006). But it is equally plausible that job enlargement may also lead to 
widespread work intensification and functional flexibility may be perceived as 
‘management by stress’ (Legge, 1998). 
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The potential impact of technology on workers’ task discretion and autonomy is a 
question that has been addressed in different organisational contexts. In the 
extensively studied call-centre sector, there is ample evidence that shows how the use 
of technology leads to Taylorization of work organization in white collar office 
settings (Bain et al., 2002). In many instances, work organization change in call 
centres followed a ‘routinization path’ entailing low levels of task discretion, tightly 
scripted dialogues and highly repetitive tasks with short task cycle times (Taylor & 
Bain, 2001, p.45; Taylor et al., 2002, p.136). Routinization circumscribed the work 
autonomy of call centre operators to a significant degree with little opportunities for 
resistance beyond individualized escape routes (Knights & McCabe, 1998). IT 
enforces standardization even further. Taylor & Bain (2007) have shown how 
software such as Blue Pumpkin, is used in call centres to provide minuted control 
over staff ‘measuring outputs and monitoring adherence’. However, there are different 
ways in which technology may be used as a form of managerial control and 
monitoring and this may also depend on the organizations’ overall strategy focused on 
quality or price as well as the context the call-centres’ clients operate (Grimshaw et 
al., 2002, pp.200–201).  
 
Hence, the tension between standardization and quality of service delivery may 
temper the degree of routinization. This can be shown more vividly, once we 
conceptualise call-centre work as a form of ‘emotional labour’ (Taylor & Bain, 2001, 
p.41). In this case, call-centre workers may be required to show ‘empathy’ thus 
suggesting higher levels of discretion (Taylor et al., 2002, p.135). When managers 
focused on quality assessments, their interest was to assess the ‘enthusiasm’, 
‘helpfulness’ and ‘tone’ (Taylor et al., 2002, p.137) that contributed to customer 
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satisfaction and quality of service delivery. This draws a parallel with the ‘emotion 
work’ required in the medical profession towards patients. Still it does not alter the 
perception of call-centre work as a ‘low-skill’ or ‘semi-skilled’ occupation, 
particularly in terms of formal qualifications and the level of training that is required. 
Our interest in this paper is to show how a routinization process can be equally 
applicable in the more ‘high-skill’ occupation of healthcare professionals.  
 
Some commentators argue that in professional settings such as healthcare the scope 
for routinization may be limited for two main reasons. First, a key element of 
healthcare professional identity is the invocation of a discourse that revolves around 
the values of safety and patient-centred care (Mueller et al., 2008, p.5). These values 
are not typically associated with standardized work tasks. Second, unlike the 
perspective of technology that may lead to deskilling and fragmentation of work 
(Munro & Rainbird, 2002, p.225), technology may confer expertise or technical 
specialisation that brings control over narrower but also more esoteric knowledge, 
which usually enhances autonomy and control (Barley, 2009).  
 
The adherence to professional values and the highly technical expertise and esoteric 
knowledge suggest that any attempt to circumscribe healthcare professional discretion 
through the introduction of technology may be met with some form of resistance. This 
opens up the possibility for healthcare professionals to uphold their professional 
values and ‘work around’ technological innovations or reject them altogether, in order 
to avoid suppressing their autonomy and discretion. Studies of healthcare 
organisations that introduced computer systems which were deemed as ‘surveillance-
capable’ suggest that nurses were able to circumvent the surveillance capability of the 
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systems (Timmons, 2003, p.151). Indeed, Berg (1997) has argued that technologies 
intended to routinize clinical work, such as decision support tools, are ‘doomed to 
fail’ as they neglect the complex context within which healthcare professionals work 
(Berg, 1997, p.7).  
 
Nonetheless, technological innovations always entail the prospect of standardization. 
At a more abstract level, assumptions designers have for instance about the user, 
about the users’ roles, needs and preferences and about the way in which users 
collaborate and interact are ‘inscribed’ into the technology to such as an extent that 
we could actually think of technology as being a script or a scenario (Akrich, 1994, 
p.208). To tailor technology users would then need then to ‘read’ technology and 
articulate their work so as to modify technology accordingly (Suchman, 2002). Along 
similar lines Grint & Woolgar (1997) argued that the user is configured by the 
technology in the sense that technology already bears assumptions about who the user 
is. Winner (1999) has gone even further to assume that technology is inscribed with 
politics, designed as it is to be used by a specific type of user, excluding all other 
potential ways of being a user. Designers’ assumptions constitute the ‘embodied 
standards’ of technology that cannot always be negotiated post-implementation 
(Kallinikos, 2010). In fact inscriptions are likely to constrain (albeit not eradicate) the 
autonomy of those who interact with technology as part of their work process. 
 
This can be further fleshed out empirically when we examine the case of electronic 
records and healthcare professionals. The latter may perceive universal guidelines as 
being rigid, restricting the use of their professional judgment (Boonstra et al., 2004). 
This signifies limited autonomy and discretion and ‘working around’ the system 
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might not always be possible. For instance, moving from paper-based to electronic 
medical records will typically standardize the categories, the sequencing of tasks, and 
determine narrowly the workload of clinicians whilst allowing managers to monitor 
‘what work there is, who has performed/should do what and when’ (Halford et al., 
2010, p.212). Yet, the implications of technology for work autonomy are not 
unidirectional and neither are they deterministic.  The introduction of technology in 
work organisation provides opportunities for more or less autonomy, and seems to 
redistribute the ability to exercise discretion both within and across healthcare 
professional groups. The question therefore should not be about whether or not there 
is resistance to technology but rather how technology is being resisted. As 
Timmermans and Berg (1997) have suggested we should explore how technological 
mediations are being negotiated, appropriated and produced anew in health contexts 
and beyond looking into local forms of standardization or what they called as ‘local 
universality’. Vikkelsø (2005) also suggested that we should move away from a 
perspective of improvement, according to which technology is assessed on the basis 
of the efficiencies and improvements it provides to professionals towards a 
perspective of distribution whereby the introduction of technology such as an EPR is 
assessed according to the changes it brings about in the ‘distribution of work, 
responsibilities, capabilities, attention and risks’ (Vikkelsø, 2005, p.23). These 
changes offer opportunities to either increase autonomy or limit autonomy or both. 
For instance, following the introduction of an EPR in a Danish hospital nurses became 
more informed about clinical decisions, which were electronic and thus visible, but at 
the same time they became responsible for inputting information, which they would 
previously only report orally (Vikkelsø, 2005). Studies have also shown how the 
introduction of technology in healthcare redistributes autonomy between different 
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healthcare professional groups that work together (Badham, 2009; Barrett et al., 
2011). For example, Barley's (1986) classic study of CT scanners indicated how 
technology disrupted work organisation and rearranged task domains and discretion 
between Radiologists and Radiology technologists.  
 
Finally, we should also consider that the ways in which standardization plays out with 
autonomy in work organisations open up a field whereby different rationalities and 
discourses are contested more visibly. Studies have shown for instance, that a 
managerial rationality may encourage standardization and control; a technical 
rationality may focus on the design and development of the ‘right’ technology 
whereas a professional rationality will typically fall back on its focus on quality of 
care and patient safety (Boonstra & Govers, 2009; Leverement et al., 1998; Mueller et 
al., 2008).  It is typical for health professionals as well as hospital managers to make 
reference to these rationalities in order to justify their decisions or actions to 
implement, enforce or resist technology and its attempts to standardization. Indeed in 
the following sections we show how healthcare professionals in the NHS reacted to 
attempts attaining to standardization of their work by invoking frequently the 
discourse/rationality of patient care. Before we do so we present in the next section 
our research design and methods.  
 
Research Design 
The Context of the study 
The National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) within the NHS in 
England provides the macro-institutional context for our study. The programme 
started under the UK Labour government in 2002 and -at the time of its inception- 
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was the largest non-military information technology project ever to be undertaken 
globally (Brennan, 2005). The NPfIT embraced the vision of transforming the NHS in 
several ways including inter alia: its clinical and administrative work practices, 
decision making processes, delivery of healthcare, and sharing of information.  
 
In this paper we focus on two Acute Trusts in the NHS that were early adopters of one 
of the pillars of the NPfIT, the NHS Care Records Service (henceforth: CRS), which 
was the national electronic patient record. This study is a part of a larger study that 
examined the implementation of the NHS CRS in 12 Trusts in England (Klecun et al., 
2014; Sheikh et al., 2011). To maintain anonymity and confidentiality, the two Trusts 
are referred here as NorthTrust and SouthTrust. The two Trusts were implementing 
different CRS systems, the AlphaSoft and BetaSoft, and a different supplier, AlphaCo 
and BetaCo, provided each system respectively. GammaCo was the Local Service 
Provider (LSP) installing BetaSoft in SouthTrust, whereas DeltaCo was the Local 
Service Provider, installing AlphaSoft in NorthTrust. It is important to highlight that 
none of the Trusts selected the system they were implementing but each Trust 
implemented the software that was offered in their region. The Department of Health 
contracted different software houses to provide CRS systems so as to avoid 
dependence on one supplier only. Trusts were contacted as early adopters to 
participate in the implementation of CRS systems but they were not party to these 
contracts (Robertson et al., 2010; Sheikh et al., 2011).  
 
NorthTrust participated in the NPfIT since 2004. It expected that its participation in 
the NPfIT would be a trigger to streamline business processes and use of information 
systems. It was anticipated that the programme would assist in the delivery of ‘joined-
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up’ clinical processes within the Trust as well as across other healthcare 
organisations; would catalyse the elimination of silos; would reduce paper usage 
through digitalisation of business processes. NorthTrust was selected as an early 
adopter of the first release of AlphaSoft. The adoption of AlphaSoft in NorthTrust 
started in January 2008 and went live in March 2009 in the Radiology and 
Orthopaedic departments for ordering requests and reporting results for postoperative 
hip and knee joint replacements, for outpatients and elective inpatient cases. It was 
initially implemented in two clinics before being expanded to two other wards and 
other departments by June 2010. The NorthTrust implemented the CRS system slowly 
so that it could be tailored to their needs and to the English NHS work setting. 
AlphaSoft was developed according to the requirements of the hospitals; it was not an 
off-the-shelf product (Cresswell et al., 2011). The implementation of AlphaSoft was 
abandoned after the dismantling of the NPfIT. 
 
SouthTrust implemented a first release of the BetaSoft in March 2007. The Trust 
anticipated a number of benefits arising from the adoption of the NHS CRS such as 
improved patient safety by having the right information, in the right time and the right 
place; better quality of care by reducing data duplication and manual data entry and 
improved clinical decision making by providing clinicians with up-to-date 
information. In contrast to NorthTrust, the SouthTrust implemented the BetaSoft 
across all its departments within a single day in a ‘big bang’ approach. BetaSoft was 
developed in the US successfully and was transferred to the English NHS. The first 
Trusts that implemented BetaSoft, including SouthTrust, had limited choice to tailor it 
to their needs (Cresswell et al., 2011). The system offered basic clinical functionality 
and the Trust was considered an early adopter. 18 months after the NCRS 
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implementation the Trust opted out of BetaSoft and reverted to an upgraded version 
of the system it was using prior to the implementation of BetaSoft. 
 
Our research design follows the comparative case study method (Yin, 2003). The case 
selection criteria include a common impetus for IT-enabled organisational change in 
the form of the umbrella NPfIT programme. As mentioned above the two NHS Trusts 
were implementing different NCRS systems offered by different suppliers. The cases 
also vary in the outcomes of implementation of this new IT system, as defined by 
participants themselves. In NorthTrust the implementation process was successful at a 
small-scale and the Trust planned to expand the rollout to other Departments, before 
the NPfIT was dismantled. By contrast, the SouthTrust prepared for the 
implementation of the new care system very enthusiastically, rolled it out, and finally 
decided to opt out of the NPfIT programme, before the latter was shut down.  
 
Research methods 
The information collected for the case studies have been gathered through semi-
structured interviews and relevant documents. Interviews were conducted between 
May 2009 and December 2010 before and after implementation of the new IT 
systems. The empirical section relies on 29 interviews in total with key informants in 
both Trusts, including different professional groups. These included: healthcare 
professionals (e.g. clinical leads, consultants, nurses, matron, etc.), managers (e.g. 
director for patient records, programme manager) and members of the technical team 
(IT technicians, IT managers). The majority of the interviews were conducted in 
person; they were recorded following oral informed consent, lasted about an hour 
each and were transcribed verbatim. The NHS Research Ethics Committee classified 
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the larger study as a Service Evaluation. We sought approval by each of the two 
Acute Trusts following research governance procedures that were in place in each of 
the two sites.  
 
Data collection was supplemented by a range of primary documents, which enriched 
our understanding of the context under investigation as they embedded the intended 
rationale that surrounded the adoption of the NHS CRS in both Trusts. Documentary 
evidence included: newspaper articles, minutes from project meetings, information 
provided by each Trust’s web site, ‘lessons learned’ reports, project initiation 
documents and risk registers. Documents were carefully read and notes were kept. 
Data analysis was an iterative and longitudinal process. Interview transcripts were 
continuously read and out of them broad themes emerged. We identified themes 
according to their relevance with the literature we reviewed and the scope of our 
study. Themes were refined and merged when needed as the analysis was progressing 
and interpretations started being developed. Some of these themes include: 
standardization of work, electronic monitoring of work, doctor-patient relationship, 
working across professional boundaries; task discretion, and autonomy. We would 
also seek to assess the validity of contradictions in the collected information through 
triangulation (interviews, primary, and secondary documents). Generally however 
contradictions found in the collected information were seen as opportunities to enrich 
our analysis by bringing to the fore additional perspectives.  
 
Technology and work autonomy in healthcare: the cases of two NHS trusts 
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In this section we examine the cases studies of two NHS trusts. In each case we 
provide a brief background of the profile of the Trust and the motivation of different 
stakeholders to implement a CRS system. The narrative of the cases focuses on the 
organisational change process and final outcomes, paying particular attention to the 
discourse of different stakeholders with regard to key themes: standardization, task 
discretion and autonomy.  
 
Standardization, task discretion and autonomy in NorthTrust  
 
The fieldwork in NorthTrust revealed that different stakeholders had different 
perspectives on the NHS CRS and its purpose. The NHS CRS has been described by 
some as being a means for monitoring the outputs of Trusts and healthcare 
professionals. Through the implementation of the CRS systems the Department of 
Health could generate aggregated information about various performance indicators 
such as costs, outputs or performance profiles of each Trust. Centralised information 
could then be used as a way to compare the results and performance of healthcare 
organisations and as a basis to make decisions on future resource allocation. 
According to the project manager, such comparisons engendered financial risk and 
raised fears of job insecurity: 
 
‘…by nature, the National Programme is going to be restrictive. It’s going to implement 
standardization… It might give you some transparencies. It might give you some aggregated 
understanding. You might find that one hospital cost profiles are completely different to 
another. You might start to look at why and people might be nervous of their jobs, even.’ 
(Programme Manager). 
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In addition, the programme manager defined the NHS CRS as a way to change the 
way work is organised in the NHS. Specifically, the programme was perceived as 
being a way to eliminate differentiation of work practices among specialties and 
wards, to standardize the process of healthcare delivery and the conduct of healthcare 
professionals and to regulate the way in which healthcare professionals interact with 
patients: 
 
‘…their ideal is that the NHS will become standardized, so the way in which we interact with 
computers and the way in which we interact with patients will become standardized’ 
(Programme Manager). 
 
Despite its small-scale implementation, AlphaSoft brought about several changes in 
the workload of healthcare professionals in NorthTrust. In particular, AlphaSoft 
computerised some doctors’ tasks by allowing them to write and dispatch X-ray 
requests though the system. Nurses previously carried out this activity and doctors 
simply signed the requests. Further, the system pre-populated data, for instance 
patients’ demographic information and medical history with the aim to speed-up and 
standardize the requesting process. In this way, it prescribed what information each 
healthcare professional group should seek. Despite this, the process was slower in 
comparison to manual completion, taking approximately five to six minutes longer. 
More importantly, unless properly checked, pre-populated data could include various 
errors. For instance, if the patient had changed their general practitioner (GP) or the 
GP had moved then a part of the patients’ demographic data fields would be 
inaccurate. This is due to a lack of synchronisation and communication between GP 
and hospital systems. 
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Also, the new system increased the workload of clinicians in the Orthopaedic 
department, because it compelled them to complete mandatory fields that were not 
deemed necessary on paper requests. In doing so, it also took away some of their 
discretion for the completion of requests. Specifically, under the paper system 
Orthopaedists were responsible for checking whether a woman is pregnant or not 
before placing an X-ray request. Clinicians would do this by observing or asking the 
patient and then they would write it down as a note. AlphaSoft standardized this 
process. If a female patient’s age was within the child bearing age -these limits were 
predefined by the system- then Orthopaedists were obliged to fill in the field on the 
request form. In the past Orthopaedists could skip this question, transferring the 
responsibility for completing the field to Radiologists. This confirmed a nurse’s 
viewpoint that the system framed and standardized their requesting behaviour. 
Standardization of requesting behaviour came from the fact that electronic forms had 
been mapped against the protocol and as a result clinicians needed to complete it in 
full in order to get it through the system: 
 
‘Now the system’s been set up so that we can only request what’s in our protocol, so you can’t 
make mistakes on it…’. (Nurse) 
 
‘…there are lots of mandatory fields on the request cards, which will have to be filled in 
otherwise the request will be bounced electronically and we won’t even see it and it would drive 
the clinicians mad…’ (Radiologist) 
 
For Orthopaedists and also for other healthcare professionals, the intervention of 
technology in their practices and the changes that this entails was perceived as being a 
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criticism of what they currently did and an attempt to curtail their autonomy by 
imposing a standardized way of working: 
 
‘... It’s that fact that that group of clinicians would need to change the way they do it for the 
greater good. So if you like, it’s a threat to their autonomy and it’s the threat to the way they’ve 
done it before. It’s almost like a criticism. We want you to change because we want you to 
conform because what you are doing is not best practice.’ (Orthopaedist) 
 
By prescribing Orthopaedist’s requesting behaviour, Radiologists became much more 
autonomous to carry out their clinical tasks. In the past they would need to check if 
Orthopaedists followed the protocol when requesting X-Ray test: 
 
‘Lots of clinicians don’t fill that in and it’s left to us to deal with when they get it…’. 
(Radiologist) 
 
In contrast to this, AlphaSoft was designed with certain in-built flaws that led to 
incomplete information. This opened up a window of opportunity for nurses to 
exercise their discretion and ‘work around’ the system. For instance, a ward matron 
argued that AlphaSoft did not provide an exhaustive list of allergies. She said that an 
allergy to a medication could be broken down to allergies to more specific ingredients 
of that medication. The system however did not provide this level of detail to nurses, 
but the nurses relied on their own expertise. If a nurse needed to update a patient 
record or send out a test or process a medical prescription, she would be unable to 
complete the task, unless she first completed the information on allergies. More 
importantly, because the input of wrong information could give rise to clinical risks, 
possibly detrimental, the matron acknowledged that many nurses were reluctant to use 
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the system. Furthermore, the new system increased the workload of nurses. Nurses in 
the Orthopaedic department were asked to scan new referrals and feed them into 
AlphaSoft. Because the system did not allow scanning en masse nurses had to do this 
individually, taking a considerable amount of time (between 15 to 20 minutes) away 
from other duties. The nurses’ range of tasks were also enlarged, since they had to 
upload pre- and post-operative score assessments into the system, which were 
previously completed on paper form by the patients themselves. 
 
AlphaSoft eliminated some of the tasks that nurses had to undertake and maintained 
others. For instance, due to the implementation of AlphaSoft nurses stopped spending 
time chasing whether a paper order has been dispatched to Radiology or not. This was 
because AlphaSoft enabled nurses to retrieve information instantly and to have greater 
visibility and monitoring of patients’ arrival in the clinic. A nurse explained: 
 
‘…on AlphaSoft I can check and see whether the patient, you know, whether they’ve had the X-
ray or not and I can keep bringing it up on the screen all the time and going back to it, you 
know, using both AlphaSoft and using the system to get the X-ray back, I can play with it at all 
times’. (Nurse) 
 
Yet, the use of computers has been added to nurses’ daily tasks and thus not all of 
them felt comfortable in using AlphaSoft. Nurses would typically report throughout 
the study their concerns about technology, how this created a fear of changing work 
practices, and the uncertainty of substituting paper for computerised systems.  
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Further, a healthcare professional from the Radiology department argued that 
AlphaSoft’s standardization did not lead to simplification of work processes, but to 
their digitalisation by transforming all paper documents into digital documents: 
 
‘…they don’t change what they do, they simply take the existing process and don’t re-examine 
it and computerise it and I think that’s a fundamental mistake’ (Radiologist). 
 
The system also influenced the work process of Radiologists who would receive 
complete and legible electronic orders that presented information in a standard format. 
This meant that they did not have to interpret bad handwriting, and thus, that they ran 
fewer risks of making mistakes. Also, electronic requests implied fewer transcription 
and data entry costs when data was transferred from the card into the Radiology’s 
information system. In addition, AlphaSoft had the potential to create time-
efficiencies by allowing the electronic dispatch of results. At the same time, the 
introduction of AlphaSoft had taken some tasks away from Radiologists. For instance, 
in the paper system they would scan the order request card, read and add extra pieces 
of information; in the new system, however, orders did not allow the addition of extra 
information. 
 
Standardization, task discretion and autonomy in SouthTrust 
 
For some interviewees in SouthTrust the NHS CRS was perceived as being a 
technology that would join-up local and national processes of healthcare delivery. 
They perceived it as a national infrastructure that would standardize patient records in 
electronic format, but also allow enough flexibility to interact with local systems that 
provided detailed information about episodes of care: 
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‘…we understood there would be a National Care Record Service which local care records 
systems would link into, so there would be your national patient information and then locally we 
would capture the details of all the episodes of care that happened at a local level.’ (Programme 
Manager). 
 
The release of BetaSoft that the Trust was implementing was described as being ‘far 
from fantastically good’ by the programme manager. When it was put into use, it 
created a number of problems to users. BetaSoft (Release 0) was described by the 
programme manager as being ‘a very windy, clunky system’ that demanded the 
completion of a great number of screens before any action could be taken. According 
to a consultant it required 27 mouse clicks to book an appointment, a minute to log 
into the system and a minute-and-a-half to retrieve a patient list from the system. This 
led to increased downtime for task completion. 
 
Also, the system standardized and limited task discretion in a number of ways. For 
instance, the system did not allow users to delete previously typed information. As a 
result, documents and forms would keep track of all changes being made to a 
document, rendering it difficult for healthcare professionals to find the right 
information in a timely manner: 
 
‘The information that it put onto the sheet of paper (discharge summaries) was impenetrably 
difficult for people to understand and didn’t allow for any localised changes… If you wrote 
down myocardium infarction and then you decided before the patient went home in fact it 
wasn’t. It would say myocardium infarction and only at the bottom it would say, actually, it 
wasn’t. It required the most ridiculous thing.’ (Clinical Lead). 
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Also, BetaSoft R.0 was designed in such a way that clinical information had to be 
captured in a sequential and highly standardized way. The system assumed that all 
clinical information is captured once and that clinical tasks are sequential and 
successive. Clinical reality however was much more messy than the assumptions 
prescribed in the technology.  Clinicians for example argued that often patients could 
be discharged without the system holding complete information about their 
admission. In reality, information is often added retrospectively, particularly during 
handovers. This discrepancy between how clinical work operates in practice and the 
assumptions about clinical work which are embodied into the technology opened up 
possibilities for missing information (when not entered on time and in full) and 
discouraged healthcare professionals for inputting information in general: 
 
‘…you had to enter the data in a sequential way for it to work. If you make a mistake, the whole 
thing gets messed up. That was very evident particularly over the handover period that we were 
putting information into an episode in different sequences. If you didn’t have the patient 
admitted before you discharged them. They were all these sorts of issues that actually caused 
problems…’ (Director of clinical services). 
 
This meant that healthcare professionals enjoyed little task discretion, as they had to 
enter information at the right time before proceeding into any clinical or 
administrative episode: 
 
‘…as it is a live time system, if you didn’t put the information in at the right time, it could cause 
a problem. Whereas with (name of the previous system) if you hadn’t admitted somebody, 
somebody else could do things retrospectively, et cetera’ (Director of clinical services). 
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This new way of working meant that users would need to spend, as the programme 
manager said, ‘more live time’ and healthcare professionals in particular become 
more responsible for inputting clinical information, a task that was previously 
undertaken by administrative staff. This indicates an enlargement of tasks for 
healthcare professionals, while tasks were removed from administrative staff. Further, 
the system would often truncate the text clinicians wrote and in doing so it could 
potentially distort diagnoses raising a number of clinical safety issues: 
 
‘If it said myocardium infarct suspected, it would just say myocardium infarct or myocardium 
infarct ruled out and it would say myocardium infarct because it only had that space. 
Amazingly, how could you design a clinical information system that didn’t even have truncation 
sorted out. Just unbelievably basic’ (Clinical Lead). 
 
Also, the system mandated clinicians to justify every order and test they were 
ordering through the system information, which clinicians deemed to be irrelevant: 
 
‘You have to manually type in the reason on each of those three requests and there are a number 
of mandatory fields that we thought were just ridiculous, such as it was a requirement for 
instance that you needed to indicate when her last menstrual period was for a blood test where it 
was completely irrelevant, just because that was sort of built into the system. The whole process 
of ordering a test took between five and 10 times as long as if you did it with a paper version’ 
(Clinical Lead). 
 
Further, the system would report the results of tests back to the consultant under 
whose name the order was being made. Consequently, consultants would receive a 
number of emails, creating bottlenecks in the workflow process, without being able 
either to prioritise them or to dispatch them to the doctor who ordered them. The 
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system therefore did not render visible the requester of a test, but rather who could 
authorise it. Additionally, the system could not keep track of any actions taken by 
clinicians in response to electronic results from a test: 
 
‘…the system that we have at the moment is that the paper results go to people and they don’t 
get filed in the notes until they are signed, so we know somebody has seen that. How do we 
know that somebody has seen the electronic version and they said, you don’t.’ (Clinical Lead) 
 
Furthermore, BetaSoft produced data that did not integrate with data produced by 
other computer systems. This created considerable data disintegration and limited the 
opportunity for thorough monitoring and auditing of clinical outputs. Finally, the 
system did not allow advanced searches within the Patient Administration System 
(PAS). As a result, it was very difficult finding a list of patients that were being 
treated by two or more doctors. 
 
As the system was not supporting users’ work practices, healthcare professionals 
produced a number of ways to “work around” BetaSoft. For instance, because 
BetaSoft did not allow the printing of patient lists, SouthTrust developed an internal 
system, which ran in parallel with BetaSoft and gave healthcare professionals 
information as to where patients were, the names of the consultant treating them and 
their health condition and allowed the generation of printouts: 
 
‘if you wanted to produce a list of patients that you could go and do a ward round and you 
couldn’t print it. You would say to them, well how can we do a ward round then, because we 
don’t have computers that we have by every bed and ones that we can carry around wirelessly 
throughout the hospital because the wireless network isn’t good enough for that. How can we do 
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that?... It had to be a very long process of, I think we ended up doing screen dumps and then 
loading those into Word where you could then print them…’ (Clinical Lead). 
 
The Trust went live with BetaSoft for a period of about 18 months. It then decided to 
stop the implementation and reverted to an upgraded version of its previous system. 
Two reasons were given for this decision. First, the Trust merged with another 
hospital, which was using the same system that the Trust had before going live with 
BetaSoft. In this way, SouthTrust achieved better integration with an improved 
version of its legacy system. This was an obvious choice, as BetaSoft was not 
delivering the benefits it has promised to deliver and furthermore GammaCo had 
walked out of the process. GammaCo came out of the contract when the Trust had 
already progressed with the implementation of BetaSoft leaving the whole process 
lacking continuity. Second, the Trust was burdened with financial costs incurred as a 
result of implementing the NHS CRS that it could no longer sustain. The clinical lead 
estimated that they had to pay £1.5 million per year: 
 
‘It has cost us millions of pounds. It’s brought our hospital nearly to its knees.’ (Consultant 
Physician) 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The article considered the cases of two NHS trusts in the context of implementing a 
new information system of electronic patient records (EPR) as a part of the National 
Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT). The two Trusts followed distinct 
paths with regard to the implementation of the new care record systems.  
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The NorthTrust, piloted the implementation of AlphaSoft in the Radiology and 
Orthopaedic Department and despite the problems of the software and the task re-
allocation, it planned to expand it to two wards. The results were quite mixed. Some 
professional groups such as clinicians highlighted the cumbersomeness of the system 
that increased downtime for task completion. Other professional groups such as 
nurses emphasised the elimination of routinized tasks, such as chasing after requests, 
and increased ability to monitor ‘what work there is, who has performed/should do 
what and when’ (Halford et al., 2010, p.212). Eventually, the momentum was lost in 
NorthTrust and the NPfIT was shut down before further implementation. By contrast, 
the SouthTrust started very enthusiastically with the implementation of the new 
system to get rid of “burning platforms” but soon realised that the new system is not 
functioning and opted out of NPfIT altogether. 
 
 
Our findings suggest that the new technologies limited the work autonomy and task 
discretion for both nurses and clinicians by engendering routinization, through their 
embodied standards. The standards that were inscribed into the technology constituted 
a reminder of how clinical work should be done; in this sense standards played the 
role of the clinical protocol (Timmermans & Berg, 1997). They were also ‘scripts’ 
constitutive of new ways of working (Akrich, 1994). Drawing on the literature on 
standardization in low-skill work and particularly studies that report on work in call-
centres, our paper suggests that technology may attain routinization of clinical work 
through standards inscribed into it by defining the mode, the content and the timing of 
healthcare work. We have shown that the ordering of an X-Ray request or a blood test 
involved the completion of mandatory fields, with information that was often 
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perceived as being redundant by healthcare professionals. The standardization of 
requesting behaviour echoes the monotony and routinization of tight scripting of call-
centre workers (Taylor & Bain, 2001; Taylor et al., 2002). Further, the system 
intervened into the content of the information that clinical work produced, for 
instance during diagnosis. As reported for example confusing truncation and lack or 
limited free text meant that clinicians’ diagnosis had to be in agreement with those 
identified by the system. Considering the fact that decisions about diagnosis and 
treatment are constitutive of clinical autonomy this example suggests how much 
technology can restrict professional judgment and jurisdiction (Boonstra et al., 2004; 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003). It also affected the quality of the information healthcare 
professionals retrieved from the system since pre-populated data were prone to 
include various errors due to problems in synchronisation between different systems.  
Finally, repetition of tasks and short task cycle times (Taylor & Bain, 2001; Taylor et 
al., 2002), typically found in low-skill work, seemed to be evident in the two EPR 
cases. Our findings have suggested that technology intervened into the temporal 
aspects of healthcare work by imposing a sequential approach to how healthcare 
information is captured. Thus, a linear logic was imposed on the dynamic and often 
complicated, if not messy, clinical work (Berg, 1997; Timmermans & Berg, 2003). 
By intervening into the mode, content, tempo, and pace of clinical work, technology 
standardized and routinized significant aspects of healthcare work namely, the 
conduct of healthcare professionals; the delivery of healthcare as well as the 
interaction between healthcare professionals and patients.  
 
The above indicates that routinization through standards embodied within the 
technology is not confined to the boundaries of low-skill work settings (Bain et al., 
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2002) but expands to professional settings that are characterised by high-skilled work. 
Our study shows that technology may become a tool that circumscribes healthcare 
professionals’ autonomy by dictating the what, how and when of their work. We are 
not however suggesting that control is a deterministic and essential effect of 
technology and neither do we wish to demonise technology. On the contrary we argue 
that the effects of technology are an outcome of the values and assumptions 
‘inscribed’ into it (Akrich, 1994). The effects of technology on work autonomy are 
thus contingent and changeable. We also argue that we should not take professional 
autonomy for granted but rather examine all the minuted ways in which it is being 
questioned, circumscribed and renegotiated by and through information technology.  
 
Yet, the implications of technology for professional work are not unidirectional and 
deterministic. Technology does not simply reduce autonomy but it also redistributes 
it. Our study adds to the literature that examines redistribution of work among 
healthcare professional groups by looking in particular into how discretion is being 
reallocated and negotiated among healthcare professionals through technology 
(Badham, 2009; Barley, 1986; Barrett et al., 2011; Vikkelsø, 2005).  
 
Our findings suggested that specific work tasks were redistributed from Radiologists 
to Orthopaedists, while the EPR freed up time for nurses, moving their invisible work 
to clinicians. These examples of redistribution of professional discretion have two 
different implications (Vikkelsø, 2005). The first case of redistribution is one in which 
redistribution of discretion coincides with redistribution of professional power and 
control within two different but equally prestigious and interdependent professional 
groups. In this case, clinicians’ power is the ability to add contextual information to a 
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patient case informing clinical practice respectively. The second case of redistribution 
of discretion between doctors and nurses suggests how EPR technology enacts the 
power of the medical protocol (Berg, 1997) by working as a mechanism that not only 
regulates and bureaucratises, but also imposes fairness, ensuring a clear division of 
labour between professional groups. We see this as an attempt to professionalise 
nurses by providing them with more opportunities to focus on patient care 
uninterrupted. 
 
Barley (2009) has suggested that technology does not only standardize and automate 
but may also confer expertise or technical specialisation that enhances autonomy and 
control. Our findings suggest that this may indeed occur provided that professional 
groups are willing and equipped to exercise discretion. In our case, nurses were 
reluctant to work on patient cases in which information about allergies needed to be 
added, and therefore resisted using the system.  
 
Resistance was emblematic of upholding professional power and retaining control of 
the duty to care for patients. Resistance was also evident when clinicians used their 
discretion and avoided making diagnoses on the system when the latter was not 
presenting medical conditions accurately. Instances of ‘working around’ the system 
were also evident when for example clinicians created an internal system to support 
omissions of the EPR system and to get timely information. The above examples 
suggest that, although limited, healthcare professionals still have some opportunities 
to exercise discretion over the use of technology by rejecting it altogether or ‘working 
around’ it, protecting their autonomy and recapturing the control of their work 
process. Discretion in the form of resistance or appropriation and enactment was 
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always done with reference to professional values; to the potential of technology to 
generate clinical risks and to commitment to patient care (Leverement et al., 1998; 
Mueller et al., 2008). Vikkelsø (2005) has suggested too that medical risks are 
produced when EPR systems fail to integrate patient information. Our case however 
illustrates that clinical risks may be produced due to the impossibility of an EPR to 
provide complete information about medical events or diagnoses. This also suggests 
the limits of health information technology to embody clinical expertise 
(Timmermans & Berg, 2003).  
 
This study aimed to reinvigorate the debate on the tension between standardization 
and autonomy by examining the case of highly skilled professional groups in the 
healthcare workplace context. Findings from this study suggest that the implication of 
technology in professional work conditions, through its embodied standards, some 
form of routinization that constrains work autonomy. We have shown how technology 
prescribes the mode, the content and the temporal aspects of clinical work affecting 
healthcare professional conduct, delivery of care, and the relationship between 
healthcare professionals and patients. We argue that the concept of routinization is not 
restricted to certain types of work (e.g. low-skilled work) but seems to travel across 
contexts including high-skill professional work environments. We have also shown 
that the consequences of technology are neither unidirectional nor deterministic; we 
should rather expect redistribution of opportunities for the exertion of professional 
discretion across professional groups. Such redistribution should be examined in the 
light of the power/control effects it brings to the fore, which are in turn a result of the 
assumptions inscribed into the technology as it is enacted in everyday work practices. 
Redistribution of opportunities to exercise discretion should also be seen as a way to 
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establish a fairer division of labour among different professional groups and to enact 
the clinical protocol. Furthermore, redistribution of discretion, far from being 
assumed, is conditional on the ability and willingness to exercise it. In a nutshell, our 
study highlighted the importance of analysing the interplay between routinization and 
autonomy in drawing insights about the dynamics of technological change that occurs 
in high-skilled workplaces.  
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